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COURTS, LEGAL CULTURE AND EU ENLARGEMENT
Tamara Ćapeta∗
Summary: The Article deals with the differences in the legal culture in the pre-2004 and post-
2004 EU Member States and candidate states and examines whether such differences prevent  
successful  participation  of  new  Member  States'  courts  in  the  Community  legal  order.  
Comparing three elements of legal culture, namely valid legal sources, interpretation of the  
law and argumentation by the courts, the author concludes that important differences do  
exist.  It  is  further  examined whether  the  last  or  future  enlargements  could endanger the 
functioning of the Community legal order due to the still existing differences in legal culture.  
The conclusion is that the membership is  possible despite the differences, as with proper  
basic education in Community law, the judges will not endanger its application. On the other  
hand, in order to participate fully in the Community legal order, i.e. in order to acquire the  
ability to participate in the constitutional discourse in the EU, East European judges will  
need more time. However, EU membership may indeed only speed up the necessary process  
of changes in the legal culture.
Introduction
This article concerns changes in the judicial branch in Croatia which are necessary in order to 
fulfil the requirements of EU membership. The judiciary is at the top of the list of EU pre-
accession  instruments  for  Croatia,  such  as  the  European  Commission’s  opinion  on  its 
application  for  membership1 or  the  Decision  establishing  a  pre-accession  framework  for 
Croatia  (European  Partnership).2 However,  these  documents  do  not  specify  what  kind of 
reform of the judiciary is necessary. In public discourse, the backlog of cases and the length 
of  the  judicial  process  are  usually  mentioned.  Without  denying  the  importance  of  these 
problems in the Croatian judicial system, this article deals with a different type of adjustment 
that will be necessary, namely, a change in judges’ understanding of the law and their own 
role in society. 
The European Commission’s opinion on Croatia’s application for EU membership states: “In 
this regard, alignment with the acquis is a necessary but not sufficient condition to meet the 
obligations of EU membership. Croatia must also take all necessary measures to create the 
necessary  implementing  structures,  to  bring  administrative  and  judicial  capacities  to  the 
required level and to ensure effective enforcement”.3 Although the Commission continues by 
stating that  “analysis  and assessment  of Croatia’s administrative and judicial  capacities  is 
therefore incorporated into each of the chapters  analysed  below”,4 one does  not  find any 
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assessment of judicial capacity in the pages that follow. What is, therefore, the “required level 
of judicial capacity” that needs to be reached for successful EU membership?
In order to answer this question, this article starts by explaining what the European role of 
national judges is, based on the author’s understanding of developments in the EU legal order. 
I then continue by arguing that there are still significant differences in legal culture in older 
EU Member States and new, ex-communist Member States or candidate countries, and that 
this difference prevents the newcomers’ national courts from assuming the constitutionalising 
role  which national  courts  have in  the  EU legal  order.  This  cultural  difference  has  been 
demonstrated  mainly  by  using  the  example  of  Croatia;  however,  references  to  other  ex-
communist legal orders are also included. 
In the last part of the article, I pose the question of whether the lack of ability to participate in 
shaping the  “new legal  order” means  that  new Member States’5 courts  will  endanger the 
existing  EU  legal  system,  and  whether  this  can  be  used  as  an  argument  to  postpone 
membership of other countries which are currently bidding for it,6 including Croatia. For this 
purpose, the constitutionalising task that judges have has been separated from tasks they have 
as general judges of Community law. I conclude that, with proper education, judges can learn 
to function as Community judges. Participation in the application of Community law should 
speed  up  a  change  in  legal  culture,  which  will,  in  time,  allow judges  to  become active 
participants in the shaping of the Community legal order as well.  
National Courts in the EU Legal Order
The two  European  courts  –  the  European  Court  of  Justice  (ECJ)  and the  Court  of  First 
Instance (CFI) – are courts of limited jurisdiction, as they may only decide those types of 
cases for which the Treaties7 has accorded them jurisdiction.8 All other cases which involve 
the application of Community law, but are not in their jurisdiction, are to be resolved by 
national courts. Such wide role of national courts is not clearly mentioned anywhere in the 
Treaties.9 This  is  regrettable  when  considered  in  terms  of  enlargement,  as  more  clear 
5 The term “new Member States” in  this  article denotes the eight  ex-communist  countries that  became EU 
members in May 2004, namely, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and 
Slovenia. Besides these, two other countries, Cyprus and Malta, joined in 2004; but they did not have communist 
pasts, and so their legal systems developed differently.
6 The waiting list for EU membership today contains five countries, of which four are ex-communist (Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Macedonia and Romania) and one is not (Turkey).  Negotiations for membership with Bulgaria and 
Romania  were  opened  in  December  1999,  and are  almost  completed.  Croatia  was  accepted  as  a  candidate 
country by the European Council’s  decision at its  meeting on 18 and 19 June 2004, with the beginning of 
accession negotiations scheduled for  17 March 2005 at  the  Brussels  European Council  in  December  2004. 
Macedonia applied for membership on 22 March 2004, and is awaiting the Commission’s opinion regarding its 
application. There are several other ex-communist countries which might apply in the future, such as Bosnia-
Herzegovina,  Serbia  and  Montenegro,  or  Albania.  This  makes  the  last  wave  of  enlargement  an  important 
example for future enlargements.
7 Under the term Treaties, I understand the Treaty establishing the European Community, the Treaty establishing 
the European Atomic Energy Community and the Treaty on European Union. The latter, however, accords rather 
limitted jurisdiction to the ECJ.
8 Regarding the organisation and jurisdiction of these two courts, see, for example, N. Brown and T.Kennedy, 
THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Sweet and Maxwell, 5th edition,2000.
9 The only place in which national courts are mentioned is Article 234 TEC. Their role in the EC legal system 
has been clarified mostly via case law. Proposals for clarifying their powers and obligations in the text of the 
Treaty were not accepted at the last Treaty revision in Nice. (See the Additional Commission’s contribution to 
the Intergovernmental  Conference on Institutional Reform: Reform of Community courts,  [2000] COM 109 
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indication  in  the  basic  text  that  national  courts  have  to  apply  Community  law  would 
encourage judges from new Member States to do so.10 Notwithstanding such ‘gap’ in the 
Treaties, nobody today disputes that, in the Community legal order, national courts act as 
“courts of general jurisdiction” for questions of Community law.11 
This is especially important when it  comes to the rights of individuals under Community 
norms.12 When protecting individual rights of Community origin,13 national courts are bound 
by certain Community law principles, which assign to them certain powers and obligations 
that do not necessarily exist in, or are even contrary to,  the internal legal systems within 
which they operate.14 Thus, for example, they are obliged to disapply internal statutes that 
contradict  Community  law,  even  if  they  are  not  allowed  to  do  so  under  internal  rules.15 
Likewise, in the name of the principle of effective judicial protection, the ECJ has required 
national courts to change their internal procedural and remedial rules. Thus national courts 
may be asked to question their internal statutes of limitation16 and, if necessary, to change 
them. The same may happen to rules on evidence,17 standing,18 and so forth. National courts 
may be  asked to  provide  remedies  that  do  not  exist  under  national  law,  such  as  interim 
injunctions against the Crown,19 damages against the legislative state,20 or calculating interest 
on the amount of damages they award, even though this is not permitted under national law.21 
final, 1.3.2000.) Nor will this situation change with the new Constitutional Treaty, which is awaiting ratification. 
See P. Steinberg, A Tentative Survey of the Innovations of the Constitution for Europe that Might Impact upon 
National Constitutional Law, Walter Hallstein-Institut für Europäisches Verfassungsrecht, WHI – Paper 14/03, 
p. 148-150.
10 Tamara Ćapeta, Preliminary Ruling Procedure after Nice, in: THE EUROPEAN UNION ECONOMIC SYSTEM AND THE 
REPUBLIC OF CROATIA’S ACCESSION, Faculty of Economics, University of Rijeka, Rijeka, 2001, p. 500.
11 J. Temple Lang,  The Duties of National Courts under Community Constitutional Law, [1997] 22 ELRev. 3. 
See also D. Simon,  Les exigences de la primauté du droit communautaire: continuité ou métamorphoses?, in: 
L’EUROPE ET LE DROIT, MÉLANGE EN HOMMAGE À JEAN BOULOUIS, Dalloz, Paris, 1991,  p. 482. 
12 Individuals have standing in European courts (the CFI in the first instance) only in actions brought against 
Community institutions (in proceedings for annulment of the act of an institution, for failure to adopt an act, and 
for  damages).  Even  where  the  Treaty  does  enable  individuals  to  come  directly  before  European  courts, 
conditions for their standing in these courts are narrowly interpreted by the ECJ. For an overview and critique, 
see E. Biernat,  The Locus Standi of Private Applicants under Article 230 (4) EC and the Principle of Judicial  
Protection in the European Community, Jean Monnet Working Paper 12/03; P. Craig, Standing, Right and the  
Structure of Legal Argument, [2003] 9 EPL 493; J.Usher, Direct and individual concern – an effective remedy or  
a conventional solution?, [2003] 28 ELRev. 575. Thus, most disputes about rights which individuals have on the 
basis of Community norms must be resolved by existing courts in the Member States.
13 The  term “right  of  Community origin”  embraces  not  only  rights  which  individuals  derive  directly  from 
Community  norms,  but  also  rights  derived  from  the  internal  legal  norms  enacted  in  implementation  of 
Community law. The latter category of rights are also Community rights with regard to their origin, and national 
norms must, therefore, be interpreted in accordance with the Community norms they implement. 
14 For more, see T. Ćapeta, SUDOVI EUROPSKE UNIJE. NACIONALNI SUDOVI KAO EUROPSKI SUDOVI. IMO, Zagreb, 2002; M. 
Claes, THE NATIONAL COURTS’ MANDATE IN THE EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION, forthcoming from Hart Publishing, 2005.
15 See Case 106/77 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal S.p.A., [1978] ECR 643.
16 E.g. Case 33/76 Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG and Rewe-Zentral AG v. Landwirtschaftskammer für das Saarland, [1976] ECR 
1989; case C-231/96 Industriale Siderurgica Srl (Edis) v. Ministero delle Finanze, [1998] ECR I-4951.
17 E.g. Case 199/82 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. SpA San Giorgo, [1983] ECR 3595.
18 E.g. joined Cases C-87-89/90 A. Verholen and others v. Sociale Verzekeringsbank Amsterdam, [1991] ECR I-3757.
19 Case C-213/89 The Queen v. Secretary of State ex parte Factortame Ltd. and Others, (1990) ECR I-2433.
20 Joined Cases C-46 and 48/93  Brasserie du Pêcheur v. Germany and The Queen v. Secretary of State for  
Transport, ex parte: Factortame Ltd and others (Factortame III), [1996] ECR I-1066.
21 Case C-271/91 M.H. Marshall v. Southampton and South West Hampshire Area Health Authorities (Marshall II), [1993] 
ECR I-4367.
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Most of this judicial acquis communautaire22 is judge-made law. In order to be able to apply 
Community law properly, national judges need to be familiar with it. This may cause certain 
problems for judges who, as is the case in Croatia, are not used to keeping up with the case 
law of courts even in their own country. Second, and more importantly,  the application of 
principles defining the powers of judges in Community law also demands a certain measure 
of creativity from judges. As will be shown below, judges from ex-communist countries often 
lack this ability. 
If applying Community law and enforcing Community rights may sometimes be a complex 
task for national judges, it is not an impossible one. With appropriate education, any judge 
can  learn  enough  to  be  able  to  apply  Community  law  properly.  However,  besides  the 
aforementioned task of applying and enforcing Community law, there is another, less visible 
but more demanding role for national  judges.  This  concerns their  place in the process of 
shaping the Community legal order. If, as Weiler describes it, “constitutionalism is the DOS 
or Windows of the European Community”,23 then the national courts of EU Member States 
are at least an  .exe programme, without which the operating system cannot run. Not only 
could  the  “new  legal  order”  not  be  enforced  without  national  courts;  without  their 
participation it would never have been created.24 
Quite often, national courts that have brought important constitutional questions to judicial 
and subsequently wider discourse, usually by way of a preliminary ruling, were courts of 
lower instance, and not the highest courts in the country.25 It will suffice to mention only a 
few examples here. In Van Gend en Loos, the preliminary question under the former Article 
177 EC26 was referred by the Tariefcommisie, the court of first instance for financial matters 
in the Netherlands.27 The supremacy doctrine was elaborated for the first time in  Costa v.  
ENEL, on a reference by the Giudice Conciliatore of Milan,28 and later, in Simmenthal II, on a 
reference by an Italian Pretore from Susa.29 The Italian Pretori have had a significant role in 
the development of some other principles of constitutional significance. Thus, for example, 
when the Pretori of Vicenza and Bassano di Grapa asked whether they could hold their state 
responsible for damages for not properly implementing a Community directive in the cases 
Francovich and Bonifaci, the development of the Community principle of state liability for 
damages was begun.30 Yet  not  only Italian judges  have initiated  the development  of  new 
principles of a constitutional character. For example, in the  Defrenne II case31 the Cour de 
travail of Brussels enabled the development of the doctrine of horizontal direct effect and the 
transformation of the equal pay principle into the general principle of gender equality in EC 
22 T. Ćapeta,, Judicial acquis communautaire, in: EU ADJUSTMENT TO EASTERN ENLARGEMENT. POLISH AND EUROPEAN 
PERSPECTIVES,  Anna  Zielinska-Glebocka  and  Andrej  Stepniak  (eds.),  Fundacja  Razwoju,  Uniwersytetu 
Gdanskiego, Gdansk, 1998, p. 80.
23 J.H.H. Weiler, The Reformation of European Constitutionalism, [1997] 35/1/ JCMS 97.
24 The  importance  of  national  courts  as  actors  in  the  EU  political  process  has  been  recognised  by  other 
disciplines, such as the political sciences. See K. Alter,  ESTABLISHING THE SUPREMACY OF EUROPEAN LAW, Oxford 
University  Press,  2001.  See  also the  study published by Slaughter,  Stone Sweet  and Weiler,  THE EUROPEAN 
COURTS AND NATIONAL COURTS. DOCTRINE AND JURISPRUDENCE, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 1998.
25 On  the  relationship  between  the  ECJ  and  the  highest  national  courts,  see  F.C.  Mayer,  The  European 
Constitution and the Courts.  Adjudicating European constitutional law in a multilevel  system,  Jean Monnet 
Working Paper 9/03.
26 Now Article 234 EC.
27 Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, [1963] ECR 1.
28 Case 6/64 Flaminio Costa v. ENEL [1964] ECR 585.
29 Simmenthal II, see n.15
30 Joined cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 Andrea Francovich and Danila Bonifaci and Others v. Italian Republic , [1991] ECR I-
5357. 
31 Case 43/75 Gabrielle Defrenne v. Sabena, [1976] ECR 455.  
4
For citation please use CYELP, volume 1. More information available at www.cyelp.com
law. English courts have pushed forward the development of the direct effects doctrine with 
regard to directives: the High Court (Chancery Division) in  Van Duyn32 enabled the ECJ to 
establish the principle whereby directives may have direct effects, while a reference by the 
Court of Appeal of England and Wales in Marshall gave the ECJ an opportunity to restrict 
such  effects  to  vertical  relations  only.33 On a  reference  by  the  German  Arbeitsgericht  of 
Hamm in  Von Colson and Kamman,34 the ECJ spelled out the principle of indirect effects, 
while it was due to a reference by the Spanish Juzgado de Primera Instancia e Instrucción no. 
1 de Oviedo in Marleasing35 that this principle was further elaborated. 
All these courts, and many others, had challenged a domestic rule of constitutional character 
or a longstanding interpretation of the legal order in their country. For instance, the rule of 
recognition, in Hart’s usage,36 was questioned when a decision on whether Community law is 
law in the domestic legal order, and what effects it has in that order, was taken out of the 
ambit of the domestic constitution. The long-cherished supremacy of the Parliament doctrine 
was questioned when the English judiciary accepted the possibility of granting injunctions 
against the Crown after the Factortame case,37 or when parliaments were held responsible for 
damages by not legislating in Brasserie de Pecheurs and Factortame III.38 
Part of the EU Constitution was thus developed through judicial challenges to the internal 
legal order. 
Another way in which national courts have pushed for further elaboration of the European 
Constitution  was by challenging the  EU constitutional  scheme, either  via the preliminary 
ruling procedure  or  outside  it.  The  best-known example  of  this  was  the  German Federal 
Constitutional Court’s refusal to accept the supremacy of Community law without adequate 
protection of human rights at the EU level.39 This led to the development of the constitutional 
doctrine in EU law, whereby human rights were introduced in the EC legal order by way of 
the general principles of Community law.40 Sometimes attempts by national judges to change 
established principles of Community law by referring to the ECJ have not been successful, yet 
have still made a difference by putting the issue on the agenda. Thus, for example, the Italian 
Giudize Conciliatore of Florence has challenged the doctrine according to which directives 
cannot have a horizontal direct effect,41 albeit without success for the time being. His attempt 
has, however, opened a lively discussion about the issue.42
32 Case 41/74 Yvonne Van Duyn v. Home Office, [1974] ECR 1337.
33 Case 152/84 M.H. Marshall v. Southampton and South-West Hampshire Area Health Authority, [1986] ECR 
723.
34 Case 14/83 Sabine von Colson and Elisabeth Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, [1984] ECR 1891. 
35 Case C-106/89 Marleasing SA v. La Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion SA, [1990] ECR I-4135.
36 H.L.A. Hart, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, 2nd edition, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994.
37 Factortame, see n.19 
38 Brasserie de Pecheurs and Factortame III , see n.20
39 Internationale Handelsgeselschaft mbH v. Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel. (Solange 
I), published in French in (1975) CDE; Wünche Handelsgesellschaft (Solange II), published in English in (1987) 
3 CMLR 225.  
40 Starting with Case 11/70  Internationale Handelsgeselschaft mbH v. Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle für Getreide  
und Futtermittel, [1970] ECR 1125. The outcome of this interplay between national and Community courts is the 
EU  Charter  of  Fundamental  Rights,  which  will  become  binding  when  and  if  the  Treaty  establishing  a 
Constitution for Europe is ratified by all Member States.  For more about the dialogue between the German 
Federal Constitutional Court and the ECJ, see J. Kokott,  Report on Germany,  in:  THE EUROPEAN COURTS AND 
NATIONAL COURTS. DOCTRINE AND JURISPRUDENCE, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 1998, p.77.
41 In case C-91/92 Paola Faccini Dori v. Recreb Srl, [1994] ECR I-3325.
42 Several Advocate Generals in the ECJ were defending his position. See Opinion of AG Lenz in the case 
Faccini Dori (see n. 41); Opinion of AG Jacobs in the case C-316/93 Vaneetveld [1994] ECR I-736; Opinion of 
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Although many issues of constitutional significance for the European legal order have already 
been settled,43 the process of constitutionalisation and, therefore, of constitutional dialogue 
between the national and European judiciaries as well is far from over.44 
In conclusion to this first  part  of the article, it  is  important to stress that the judges who 
initiated  the  creation or  refinement  of  European  constitutional  principles  were  willing  to 
challenge established legal rules by opposing them to certain other values which they believed 
had been neglected by such rules. They challenged either domestic rules, relying on the new 
values  imported  by  the  new European  legal  order,  or  the  newly-established  rules  of  the 
European legal order, defending the values of the domestic legal order. They were creative 
judges who used all the possibilities of the two legal orders to try and improve legal rules.45 
Differences in Legal Culture and the Constitutionalising Role of Judges
As European judges, national judges need to be able to participate in European constitutional 
discourse.46 Are Central and Eastern European judges ready for this constitutionalising role, 
are they ready to participate in shaping the Constitution for Europe? In this section, drawing 
mostly on the example of Croatia, I will try to show that a long tradition of strict formalism 
and  positivism  in  Central  and  Eastern  Europe  leaves  judges  there  unprepared  for  their 
constitutionalising role. A longer time will be necessary to adjust to this requirement of the 
European legal order.
Without any ambition of providing a detailed analysis (which has been done by others47), I 
wish to point out the existing differences between the predominant legal cultures in the EU 
AG Van Gerven in the case Marshall II (see n.21). The scholars have also participated in the discussions. See, 
for  example,  W.  Van  Gerven,  The  Horizontal  Effect  of  Directive  Provisions  Revisited:  The  Reality  of  
Catchwords, in: INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF HENRY G. SCHERMERS, ed. 
by Deirdre Curtin & Ton Heukles, Vol II,  Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrechts/Boston/London, 1994, p. 
334; J.Coppel, Rights, Duties and the End of Marshall, (1994) 57 MLR 859; F. Emmert and M. Pereira de Azevedo, 
Les jeux sont fait: rien ne va plus ou une nouvelle occasion perdue par la CJCE, (1995) RTDE 11.
43 Or, it is possible that such questions will never be finally settled. Thus, for example, the last enlargement 
(2004) reopened the question of final authority in a fundamental rights violation by Community law. See, in this 
regard, A.Sajó,  Learning Co-operative Constitutionalism the Hard Way: The Hungarian Constitutional Court  
Shying Away from EU Supremacy, (2004) 3 ZSE 351.
44 One  of  the  unsettled  questions  was  put  on  the  agenda  by  the  Maastricht  decision  of  the  German 
Bundesverfassungsgericht  (published  in  English  in  (1994)  1  CMLR  57).  This  concerns  the  division  of 
competences in a federal-like legal order such as that of the EU. The issue is who (which court) is competent to 
judge whether the EU has acted outside the competences transferred to it by the Founding Treaty. Enactment of 
the new Treaty, which bears the name of a Constitution, will not solve this and similar issues in and of itself.  
Therefore, the dialogue between European and national judiciaries on issues important for the EU legal order 
will continue.
45 I  cannot,  however,  claim that  the  entire  judiciary in  every older  EU Member  State  is  able  to,  or  does, 
participate  in  constitutional  discourse.  Neither  the  Commission’s  Annual  Reports  on  the  application  of 
Community  law  (published  annually  at  europa.eu.int/comm/secretariat_general/sgb/droit_com/index_en.htm) 
nor the statistics published on the web page of the European Court (curia.eu.int/) give enough information to 
enable valid conclusions. What is important, however, is that even if only some of the courts in older Member 
States participate in the constitutionalisation process, this does not prevent us from concluding that the legal 
culture in those countries differs from that prevailing in the new Member States or candidate countries, which 
emerged from the collapse of communism.
46 This is not to say that the same qualities are not welcome within the internal legal order. On the contrary, I will 
argue that precisely because Croatian judges lack these qualities in internal law, they are not yet prepared for 
their European role.
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and its older Member States,48 on the one hand, and those in Central and Eastern European 
countries, on the other. By the term “legal culture” I understand the prevailing opinion in a 
society on the purpose of the law and the role of different institutions within the legal order, 
as well as the way in which legal rules are interpreted. John Bell has defined legal culture as 
“a specific way in which values, practices and concepts are integrated into the operation of 
legal institutions and the interpretation of legal texts”.49 
In  the  European  countries  of  the  20th century  political  “West”,  the  realism  movement 
influenced the prevailing understanding of law, albeit to a much lesser degree than in the 
USA. Strong formalism was replaced by a more pragmatic approach to the law. This also 
influenced the understanding of the roles of different actors, including courts. It was more or 
less openly50 admitted that courts participate in the process of creating law, and thus they have 
also been perceived as political actors.51 The change in the perception of the place of the 
judiciary in the society was also significantly influenced by the participation in the European 
integration  process.  Pragmatic  case  law  of  the  European  Court  of  Justice  influenced  the 
national judiciaries of the EC/EU Member States.
On the other hand, the political “East” of the European continent was not exposed to this 
change in legal thinking.52 The positivism that followed the major codifications of the 19th 
century remained the prevailing understanding of law throughout the 20th century and into the 
21st. Formalism became even stronger in these countries. Courts were mere exponents of the 
law, and the law was what was written in the legal codes.53 After the fall of the communist 
regimes at the end of the 1980s many legal norms changed, but the general understanding of 
what the law was could not change overnight. These legal systems are now being transformed 
and exposed to different theories of law; however, a change in legal culture takes time. The 
process of gradual integration into the EU should help to speed up the transformation of 
Central and Eastern European legal cultures. 
47 M.Cappelletti, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE , Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989, especially Part 
I entitled: The evolving role and responsibility of judges. M.W. Hesselink,  THE NEW EUROPEAN LEGAL CULTURE, 
Nijhoff,  2001. Z. Kühn,  Worlds Apart. Western and Central European Judicial Culture at the Onset of the  
European Enlargement, American Journal of Comparative Law 2005, forthcoming.
48 The term “older member States” is used to denote EU Member States prior to the 2004 enlargement.
49 J. Bell,  English Law and French Law – Not So Different? (1995) CLP 69, p. 70; quoted as per Hoecke and 
Warrington,  Legal Cultures, Legal Paradigms and Legal Doctrine: Towards a New Model for Comparative  
Law, (1998) 47 ICLQ 495,  p. 498. 
50 In  some countries  this  is  not  obvious  at  first.  The French judiciary,  for  example,  maintains  the  outward 
impression of being completely outside any political process, of being a mechanic applier of the legal rules 
contained in the code. The situation is quite different if one looks behind its brief and formalistic published 
judgments.  See,  in  this  regard,  M.  Lasser,  Anticipating  Three  Models  of  Judicial  Control,  Debate  and  
Legitimacy: The European Court of Justice, the Cour de cassation, and the United States Supreme Court, Jean 
Monnet Working Paper 1/03, especially p. 5-23.
51 A. Stone Sweet, Constitutional Politics: The reciprocal impact of lawmaking and constitutional adjudication, 
in: LAWMAKING IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, Paul Craig and Carol Harlow (eds.), Kluwer Law International, 1998, p. 
111. A. Stone Sweet, Governing with Judges. Constitutional Politics in Europe, OUP, 2000.
52 Z.  Kühn,  Worlds  Apart.  Western  and  Central  European  Judicial  Culture  at  the  Onset  of  the  European 
Enlargement, American Journal of Comparative Law 2005, forthcoming.
53 One possible explanation for the strong judicial formalism in communist states is that judges stuck to the letter 
of the law in order to avoid influence by the Communist Party, which attempted to sway the courts towards 
interpretations of the law that suited its political goals. 
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Legal culture in Croatia is also still largely positivistic and formalistic.54 A view of the law as 
a set of written rules is not only common among Croatian judges, but also among lawyers in 
general and the public at large. The best example of this is the typical usage of the word ‘law’ 
in the media (both TV and newspapers), as well as the writings of lawyers, where it is given 
as zakon, meaning “statute”, and not as pravo, meaning “law”. Courts are still understood as 
impersonal, rational institutions, able to objectively apply legal rules, yet having no role in the 
law-making process. Courts, therefore, cannot have a judicial policy, as their only task is to 
resolve individual cases by applying objective rules of law that contain all the answers.55
In  order  to  compare  legal  cultures,  I  will  use  the  model  proposed  by  Hoecke  and 
Warrington.56 They identify the following elements as factors in building a paradigm for legal 
culture: (i) a concept of law – what law is and its relation to other social norms; (ii) a theory 
of valid legal sources; (iii) a methodology of law, both for making and for adjudicating it, 
primarily a theory of interpretation; (iv) a theory of argumentation – what kind of arguments 
are accepted, i.e. only legal ones or others as well?; (v) a theory of legitimisation; and (vi) a 
common basic ideology – common basic values and a common basic world view. These 
elements may be used for comparisons on the macro level between different legal families, for 
example, between European law and Asian law, but also for comparisons on the micro level, 
including detecting differences in the understanding of the law by different actors within the 
same legal system (for example, civil and administrative jurisdictions).57 
Although it  can probably be  demonstrated  that  all  these  elements  differ  in  some respect 
between Western and Eastern Europe, I will try to illustrate differences in terms of three of 
the enumerated elements, namely, those contained in (ii), (iii) and (iv). These differences are 
large enough to justify a conclusion that the legal cultures in these societies differ. And it is 
precisely  this  difference  that  renders  Eastern  European  judges  unable  to  participate  in 
European constitutional discourse. 
a) Valid Legal Sources
On a  theoretical  level,  the  systematisation  of  valid  legal  sources  in  the  legal  systems  of 
Western  and  Eastern  Europe  does  not  differ  considerably.  Thus,  in  all  these  countries 
constitutional norms are at the top of the hierarchy, followed by statutes and by-laws. General 
principles of law are often included among the legal sources. International law, written or 
unwritten,  is  another source of law, although this  is  not  entirely  visible in dualistic  legal 
systems. Likewise, in legal textbooks it is accepted that case law also represents a kind of 
legal source.58 Among the sources that are not formally legally binding, yet can inform judges 
in the adjudication process, textbooks mention various types of soft law and, quite often, legal 
54 See also S. Rodin, Discourse and Authority in European and Post-Communist Legal Culture, published in this 
issue.
55 See,  for  example,  Ž.  Horvatić,  Problem odnosa  u  zakonu  propisane  i  sudskim presudama  primijenjene  
kaznenopravne represije prema počiniteljima kaznenih djela, (2004) 11 Hrvatski ljetopis za kazneno pravo i 
praksu/Croatian Annual of Criminal Law and Practice 381, on p. 388: “In modern states organised in accordance 
with the principle of the separation of powers, judicial power does not, and cannot, have any sort of ‘policy’, nor 
may its action when applying the law be described in that way”. (In the original: “Sudbena vlast u suvremenim 
državama koje su organizirane po načelu diobe vlasti nema niti može imati bilo kakvu ‘politiku’, niti se tako  
može označavati njezino djelovanje kada primjenjuje zakon”). 
56 Hoecke and Warrington,  Legal Cultures, Legal Paradigms and Legal Doctrine: Towards a New Model for  
Comparative Law, (1998) 47 ICLQ 495, p. 514-515.
57 Ibid, p. 515.
58 Usually referred to in Croatian legal textbooks as indirect source of law. See, for example, M.Vedriš and P. 
Klarić, GRAĐANSKO PRAVO, Narodne novine, Zagreb, 2003, p. 22.
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doctrine. Differences regarding legal sources, though not visible in theory, do, however, exist 
in practice, i.e. in what legal sources are really used in the judicial process. 
 
In the older EU Member States and the EU legal system itself, all the types of legal norms 
enumerated above are used as legal sources in judicial practice. Apart from written legal acts, 
unwritten  legal  rules,  usually  called  general  principles  of  law,  play  an  important  role  in 
adjudication.  A  number  of  formally  non-binding  sources,  or  soft  laws,59 are  used  as  a 
persuasive authority when judges are deciding disputes. Policies, expressed in different forms, 
also inform judges in their adjudication. Case law occupies an important place among the 
sources of law, almost as much in the countries of continental Europe as in the common law 
countries.60 Legal doctrine is also important, although this is more evident in some countries, 
like Germany, than in others like France and the UK. Moreover, these legal sources have lost 
their  strict  Kelsenian  hierarchical  order;  indeed  sometimes,  for  instance,  regarding  the 
question of  hierarchy between EU and domestic  constitutions,  an  insistence  on  hierarchy 
would block the operation of the law.
In contrast, in Central and Eastern European countries, including Croatia, only the written 
legal sources that form part of domestic law are used by judges in practice. Judges rarely 
apply any other rules than statutory rules and by-laws in the adjudication process. Croatia’s 
Act on Courts61 enumerates  the legal acts which constitute sources of law for judges:  the 
Constitution, statutes, ratified international treaties, and other acts adopted in accordance with 
the Constitution, international treaties, and the Statute. Although the Constitution is among 
the sources of law thus enumerated,62 courts rarely apply it. The same is true for international 
treaties. 63 Thus the principal sources of law for judges are the Statute and the by-laws passed 
in order to implement it. Courts almost never refer to any other sources besides these. 
A  Kelsenian  hierarchy  exists  among  these  acts,  with  the  Constitution  at  the  top  of  the 
pyramid.  However,  even though every statute  must  comply  with  the  Constitution,  judges 
never  question  their  constitutionality.  Under  Croatia’s  constitutional  order,  judges  do  not 
possess the power to disapply statutes on their own. If they consider that a statute should not 
be applied, they have the procedural instrument of preliminary constitutional review at their 
disposal, namely, reference to the Constitutional Court.64 Judicial review of statutes is thus 
centralised, yet still enables ordinary judges to question their validity, although they may not 
determine this themselves. However, in the 14 years the new constitutional order has existed, 
there  has  not  been  a  single  preliminary  reference  for  constitutional  review  to  the 
59 For a study on the use of soft law instruments in the EU, see L. Senden, SOFT LAW IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW.  
ITS RELATIONSHIP TO LEGISLATION, forthcoming from Hart Publishing, 2005.
60 See, for example, T. Koopmans, Stare Decisis in European Law, ESSAYS IN EUROPEAN LAW AND INTEGRATION, ed. 
by David O’Keeffe and Henry G. Schrermers, Kluwer-Deventer/the Netherlands, 1982., p. 11; M. Cappelletti, 
The Doctrine of Stare Decisis and the Civil Law: A Fundamental Difference - or no Difference at All?,  in: 
Bernstein,Drobnig and Koetz (eds.), Festschrift fuer Konrad Zweigert, Tuebingen, 1981, p. 381-393.
61 Article 5 of the Act on Courts, Narodne novine 3/94, 100/96, 115/97, 131/97, 129/00, 67/01, 5/02, 101/03, 
117/03, 17/04, and 141/04. 
62 The Constitution as a source of law for judges is expressly mentioned not only in the Act on Courts, but in the 
Constitution itself. See Article 117 of the Croatian Constitution, Narodne novine 41/2001, consolidated text.  
63 For example, Croatia has been a party to the European Convention on Fundamental Human Rights since 1997. 
A web search of available case law (at  www.vsrh.hr) resulted in 0 cases of direct application of the European 
Convention by ordinary judges in resolving a dispute. There are, however, a few examples of direct application 
of some other international treaties by ordinary courts, such as the Vienna Convention on the International Sale 
of  Goods (see decision by the Croatian Supreme Court,  VSRH II  Rev – 61/99-2) or  of some international 
maritime conventions (see decision by the Croatian Supreme Court, VSRH Gzz 8/1992-2). 
64 Article 37 of the Constitutional Law on the Constitutional Court, Narodne novine 49/2002.
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Constitutional  Court.65 Thus,  either  all  of  Croatia’s  laws  are  perfectly  written,  or  judges 
simply do not question their validity. As the former is less probable, it is justifiable to ask 
why judges do not question the statutes. The reason is probably twofold. Firstly, judges do not 
take the Constitution into consideration as a source of law when adjudicating cases, as they do 
not regard it as a normative act, but rather as if it were a political programme or a broad 
framework for the legal system, one which receives legal status only upon the adoption of 
statutes and implementing acts. Secondly, a very narrow and simplistic understanding of the 
separation of powers doctrine has resulted in judges regarding it as improper to question the 
validity of legal norms made by Parliament. 
By questioning the validity of statutes in light of the Constitution, judges could participate in 
the domestic  process  of constitutionalisation.  If,  however,  this  is  not  the case,  despite  an 
explicit enabling clause in the domestic Constitution, one cannot expect that it will happen in 
a European framework, either. 
As the Constitution is not taken as a source of law, it is even less probable that judges would 
consider other legal rules, with no formally binding legal force, to be relevant in adjudication. 
Thus,  different  possible  types  of  soft  law instruments  are  not  being  used  in  the  judicial 
process. In Croatia, case law is not a source of law for judges, either, not even as persuasive 
authority. This is not surprising as, until recently, judicial decisions were not even reported.66 
Thus, it was practically impossible to take decisions by other judges into consideration. Based 
probably on the belief that judges have nothing to do with creating law, and that “the law” is 
something written in the statutes, such that case law is irrelevant, courts’ decisions were not 
regularly published. Judgments were published only occasionally, and then not even in their 
entirety, but rather only those extracts which the person preparing a publication deemed to be 
relevant. This situation has started to improve only recently. Since the first half of 2004, there 
is a new web page for the Supreme Court,67 where all new as well as many older judgments 
by the Court are published in their entirety.68 While the decisions of ordinary courts have not 
been published until recently, decisions by the Constitutional Court are regularly published in 
their entirety in the Official Gazette, called Narodne novine.69 
Ordinary courts thus do not take case law into consideration when adjudicating cases. On the 
other hand, the Constitutional Court has recently begun regarding case law as a legal source. 
Thus, for example, in a recent case brought on the basis of a constitutional complaint, the 
Court cited decisions by the European Court of Human Rights and the Croatian Supreme 
Court.70 
65 This  conclusion  was  reached  after  searching  the  available  Internet  case  law  databases  of  the  Croatian 
Constitutional Court and Supreme Court. 
66 In most other ex-communist countries, court rulings, at least rulings from higher courts, were published. It 
seems that judicial decisions were not made public only in Croatia and Romania. 
67 At www.vsrh.hr  
68 The search capabilities of this website are not too helpful, however. Another problem is that only decisions of 
the Supreme Court are published, and not those of lower instances. Due to the rather brief explanatory sections 
of these decisions, it is sometimes difficult to understand what a particular case was actually about.
69 The decisions of the Constitutional Court are also accessible on the Court’s web page at www.usud.hr 
70 Decision U-III/1733/2000 of 24 November 2004, paragraph 7. The case was brought by a person whose appeal 
in criminal proceedings had been dismissed as belated. The court of first instance that decided in the case had 
given incorrect instructions regarding the time limit for lodging an appeal, namely, 15 days, rather than the eight 
days prescribed by the Criminal Procedure Act in such cases. The appeals court dismissed the appeal as belated, 
basing its decision on the time limit prescribed by the Code. The Constitutional Court considered that, in this 
manner, the person in question had been deprived of the right to a fair trial and the right to an appeal guaranteed 
by the Constitution. It cited a decision by the European Court of Human Rights in order to justify its view that 
the procedure was to be regarded as a single whole, as well as the Supreme Court’s decision confirming that 
incorrect instructions cannot deprive a person from the right to an appeal.
10
For citation please use CYELP, volume 1. More information available at www.cyelp.com
Non-publication  of  judicial  decisions  has  also  prevented  the  development  of  discourse71 
between the judiciary and academic communities, which is an important element in shaping 
the legal order in European countries and the EU itself.72 As Kühn notes, in Eastern Europe 
the task of legal scholars at universities has been to comment on the texts of the legal codes73 
and, in the best case, to compare the text of domestic code in a certain area with that of other 
countries.  Scholars  have  not  and  (as  the  court  decisions  were  not  published)  could  not 
comment on the interpretation of legal norms in practice. The social impact of legal norms 
was not, and still is not, considered important, at least not in the legal profession. All of this 
has also influenced legal education. 
b) Interpretation of the Law
When the formalism of the 19th century was gradually replaced by a more flexible, pragmatic 
approach to law in Western European countries, the prevailing method of interpretation of the 
law,  be it  statutes  or  that  made by judges,  became teleological  or  purposive.  In  order  to 
understand what a legal rule means, judges take into account its purpose. The purpose of a 
norm is assessed in a contemporary context, one where the real social situation is important. 
The wording of a norm, while not completely unimportant, plays a secondary role. 
On the contrary, judges in Eastern Europe look almost exclusively at the text of a norm when 
assessing  its  meaning  in  the  case  at  hand.  The  unclear  wording  used  in  legal  norms  is 
understood in a way in which it has been explained by the legal doctrine in pre-formulated 
legal constructions, or legal concepts. Legal concepts are a world of their own, very often 
with little connection to reality, and very often learned at the times when a judge was still a 
student of law at the university. Legal concepts are also something which lawyers are very 
proud of: this is what makes them lawyers, because while non-lawyers can read the text of the 
codes, they cannot understand it, as they are not familiar with the legal concepts. 
That  the  text  of  a  norm is  considered  to  be  all  that  matters  in  its  interpretation  can  be 
demonstrated by a few examples from Croatian legal practice. The first example concerns the 
interpretation of the Enforcement  Act.  The case was the following: Mr.  X,74 the absolute 
guarantor to a debt owed to a certain financial institution, refused to pay the debt voluntarily. 
The creditor brought a court action against him, and the court ordered him to pay the sum 
owed together with interest. As Mr. X still refused to pay, the creditor started enforcement 
proceedings in the Municipal Court in Virovitica. After two unsuccessful public auctions, at 
which nobody bid for the debtor’s property, the court accepted an offer of HRK 175 at the third 
auction in December 2000, and sold the property. The only bidder was the creditor himself. 
The property thus sold consisted of a house, land, and an orchard. Its value was estimated at 
HRK 62,267, while the total debt thus enforced was HRK 19,708. Mr. X lodged an appeal 
against the order by the Municipal Court with the County Court in Bjelovar. In January 2001, 
71 On the importance of discourse for the creation of a legal order and differences in discourse in democratic and 
communist countries, see Rodin, S., Discourse and Authority in European and Post-Communist Legal Culture, 
published in this issue.
72 On the importance of interaction between doctrine and the courts, see Van Hoecke, M./Warrington, M., Legal 
Cultures,  Legal  Paradigms  and  Legal  Doctrine:  Towards  a  New  Model  of  Comparative  Law,  (1998)  47 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 495, p. 523 et seq. 
73 Z.  Kühn,  Worlds  Apart.  Western  and  Central  European  Judicial  Culture  at  the  Onset  of  the  European 
Enlargement, see n. 52 
74 In Croatia, names of parties to a case are not reported when court decisions are published.
75 EUR 1 = approx HRK 7.5
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the  latter  upheld  the  order  by  the  Municipal  Court.  Mr.  X  then  lodged  a  constitutional 
complaint with the Constitutional Court, which nullified the decisions of both the Municipal 
Court and County Court.76 The ordinary courts based their decisions to sell the property for 
only HRK 1 on Article 97/4 of the Enforcement Act, which then read as follows: “If the 
immovable property is not sold at the second auction, the court will, within at least 15 and at 
most 30 days, organise a third auction, at which the immovable property may be sold without 
a minimum lowest price in relation to its established value (…)”.77 Both the Municipal Court 
and the County Court based their decisions exclusively on the text of the provision quoted, 
which they interpreted as meaning that the court could not refuse any offer.78 They entirely 
disregarded the purpose of the enforcement proceedings, which was to settle the debt, not to 
punish the debtor.79 They also interpreted the provision in question outside any context. They 
even disregarded other provisions of the Enforcement Act,80 not to mention the wider legal 
context, including constitutional guarantees, based on which the Constitutional Court nullified 
their decisions in the constitutional complaint procedure.
Another example concerns a case in which a person claimed damages from the Republic of 
Croatia due to invalidity arising from his service in the Yugoslav Army. Three courts – the 
Municipal Court of Imotski in the first instance, the County Court of Split on appeal, and the 
Supreme Court in revision proceedings – opined  that the Republic of Croatia could not be 
sued, as it was not the successor to the obligations of the former Yugoslavia. The Supreme 
Court explained its decision as follows: “The fact that damages were caused to a citizen of the 
Republic of Croatia is not sufficient in itself, in the absence of a specific act on succession in 
this regard…”.81 What the Supreme Court was looking for was a specific act in Croatian law 
(a  statute  or  similar)  which  would  explicitly  stipulate  that  Croatia  had  assumed  tortious 
liability for acts or omissions of the former Yugoslavia. In the absence of such a specific 
provision, the ordinary courts concluded that a tortious liability could not exist. The claimant 
lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court, which invoked constitutional 
guarantees and international law to nullify all three decisions by the ordinary courts.82 These 
sources were not even considered by the ordinary courts, including the Supreme Court, as 
potentially relevant to the case in question. 
Formalism in interpretation by ordinary courts is so entrenched that the Constitutional Court 
has felt the need to explicitly warn them not to base their decisions exclusively on formal 
criteria.83 However, the Constitutional Court itself has sometimes given a very narrow and 
formalistic interpretation of the Constitution. Thus it was unable, in a series of decisions, to 
determine that the guarantee of a fair trial includes the right to receive a decision regarding a 
person’s rights within a reasonable time. According to the Constitutional Court, the right to a 
fair  trial  within  a  reasonable  time  did  not  exist  in  Croatia  before  its  ratification  of  the 
76 Case U-III/488/2001. Only the decision of the Constitutional Court was published. Thus, all information given 
in this text is as given in that decision. See also case U-III/1112/2001.
77 In Croatian, Article 97/4 OZ read as follows: “Ako nekretnina ne bude prodana ni na drugom ročištu, sud će u 
roku od najmanje 15 do najviše 30 dana zakazati  treće ročište na kojemu nekretnina može biti prodana bez 
ograničenja najniže cijene u odnosu na utvrđenu vrijednost.(…)”.
78 As reported in the decision of the Constitutional Court U-III/488/2001 in its paragraph 4. 
79 This was also pointed out by the Constitutional Court in paragraph 8 of decision U-III/488/2001.
80 Article 6 of the Enforcement Act provides that, during enforcement proceedings, the dignity of the person 
against whom the enforcement is being undertaken should be taken into consideration, and that the enforcement 
is  to  be  implemented in  a  manner  which is  least  disadvantageous  for  the  person against  whom it  is  being 
undertaken. Article 70 of the Enforcement Act provides that enforcement of a monetary debt cannot be executed 
on property necessary for the life of the person against whom it is being undertaken and his dependents. 
81 Decision by the Constitutional Court in case U-III/273/1999 of 21 February 2001, paragraph 4. 
82 Decision of the Constitutional Court in case U-III/273/1999 of 21 February 2001. 
83 Decision of the Constitutional Court in case U-III/956/1999 of 5 April 2000. 
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European  Convention  on  Human  Rights  and  Fundamental  Freedoms  in  1997.  The 
Constitution was amended on 9 November 2000, and today its Article 29 expressly provides 
for  the reasonable time requirement.  Before  this  amendment,  the  right  to  a  fair  trial  was 
guaranteed  by  the  Constitution,  yet  without  explicit  reference  to  a  reasonable  time 
requirement. The Constitutional Court did not deem it appropriate to infer this right either 
from the general constitutional framework or, even more obviously, from the express right to 
a fair trial, which had been guaranteed by Article 29 of the Constitution since 1990, but only 
amended in 2000 to include the right to a judicial decision within a reasonable time.84 This is 
an example of the Constitutional Court’s inability to construe an existing provision of the 
Constitution in any other way than by a literal reading of its text. 
Just as ordinary judges never apply the Constitution directly, either as a source of rights and 
obligations, or as norm against which the validity of other norms may be assessed, they also 
never use it in interpreting statutes. This neglect of the Constitution is not an exception, but 
rather the rule in judicial circles. This is why the Constitutional Court has cautioned judges 
that the Constitution also has interpretative effects.85 Thus, in a recent case concerning the 
procedural  time  limit  in  bankruptcy  proceedings,  the  Constitutional  Court  stated  the 
following: 
“The Constitutional  Court considers  it  important  to  refer  to the provision of Article  117, 
paragraph  3  of  the  Constitution,  which  reads:  ‘Courts  adjudicate  on  the  basis  of  the  
Constitution and legal acts’.  Therefore,  interpretation and application of a legal provision 
must take into consideration the provisions of the Constitution which guarantee constitutional 
rights and fundamental freedoms.”86
As textual interpretation is still the principal method of interpretation used in ex-communist 
countries, the purpose of a rule and, therefore, the context in which it exists are not considered 
by judges. The social context is rarely taken into account in their judgments, and even more 
rarely  mentioned.  Examples  of  decisions  in  which  judges  actually  have  justified  their 
interpretation of the law by reference to a social context demonstrate that they are prone to 
misunderstand what this means. Thus, the Chamber of the County Court of Gospić sentenced 
a person of Serbian nationality to 13 years  in prison for crimes against  prisoners of war, 
explaining its decision by referring, among other things, to the “fact” that the “Serbian people 
have been committing genocide against Croats…for over 500 years”.87 This example shows 
that a de-formalisation of the legal system, which gives judges greater freedom and creativity 
in interpretation, but also requires a level of social responsibility from them, will not be easy 
to achieve. Rather,  it  may easily turn into a  situation where the context in  which judges 
determine the purpose and meaning of a norm is merely their own personal view. This is not 
to say that personal views do not influence judicial decisions, only that judges must be aware 
that there are limits to this. Although these limits are not easy to define in general, it is clear 
that they may be found by examining the policy surrounding the legal norms, as expressed in, 
84 See, for example, decisions of the Constitutional Court U-III A/2933/2002 and U-III/A2303/2003.
85 Even though Croatian Constitutional Court did engage in a dialogue with the ordinary courts, its influence on 
changes of legal culture in the ordinary courts is far less important than in some other countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe, like, for instance, Chech Republic. See in this respect, Z. Kühn, Worlds Apart. Western and 
Central European Judicial Culture at the Onset of the European Enlargement, see n. 52
86 Decision of  the  Constitutional  Court  in  case U-III/1569/2001  of  9  December  2004,  paragraph  6.  In  the 
original, it reads as follows: “Ustavni sud ocjenjuje važnim istaknuti odredbu članka 117. stavka 3. Ustava koja 
glasi: ‘Sudovi  sude na temelju Ustava i  zakona’.  Stoga,  tumačenje i  primjena neke zakonske odredbe mora 
uvažavati odredbe Ustava kojima su zajamčena ustavna prava i temeljne slobode.”
87 This decision was nullified by the Supreme Court on a number of grounds, and was returned for retrial before 
a completely different chamber, due to the aforementioned explanation by the judges presiding over the previous 
trial. Only the decision of the Supreme Court was published, as No. I KŽ 862/03-8 of 29 January 2004.
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among other things, soft law instruments, as well as considering the consequences of this or 
that interpretation not only for the person before the court, but also for society in general. And 
this is something which formalist judges do not take into account. 
The non-publication of judicial decisions in Croatia (as mentioned above) has also prevented 
the  public’s  involvement  in  the  formation  of  judicial  opinions  regarding  the  appropriate 
interpretation  of  legal  norm(s).  Even today,  commenting in public  on a  court’s  decisions 
which are not  res iudicata is regarded as undue influence on the judges (endangering their 
independence), and is even punishable.88 The result of this is that judicial decisions are not 
published until they have reached that state of the proceedings where they can no longer be 
challenged. As it often takes very long for a judicial process to reach a phase where no further 
legal remedies are available to the parties,89 this can postpone comment on a judicial decision 
to the point where it becomes irrelevant. However, the situation has been improving in recent 
years, as important court proceedings, especially those related to the recent war, or corruption 
and  organised  crime,  are  receiving  more  and  more  publicity  in  the  media.  Thus  public 
discourse has been enabled, informing judges of the social implications of different outcomes 
in such cases.  
c) Argumentation
Another element of legal culture previously mentioned here is the theory of argumentation; in 
other words, the question of what arguments can be used in interpreting the law – only legal 
ones, or others as well? From what was stated earlier, it should already be obvious that non-
legal  arguments  are  not  regarded  as  valid  in  the  judicial  process  in  Central  and  Eastern 
Europe. Rather, arguments are based on the text of legal norms or legal concepts. Only if a 
legal concept refers to another type of argument, such as statistics or the like, can they be 
taken into account. It is, therefore, doubtful whether Croatian courts will be able to apply, for 
example, the principle of effectiveness as the guiding principle defining the powers and duties 
of national courts as Community courts, or the principle of non-discrimination, especially in 
recognising cases of indirect discrimination. 
Although there have been certain improvements, Croatian judges still function in a system 
which is largely formalistic and denies judges any role in creating the law. Judges’ perception 
of their own role fits into this system. They see themselves as mechanical appliers of written 
law, which contains the solutions to all possible real-life situations, so that all disputes may be 
resolved by pure deductive logic.90 Such a self-perception does not place them on a equal 
footing with the other branches of government.  For this reason, judges lack the ability to 
88 Article 309 of the Criminal Code, Narodne novine 110/97, as amended in Narodne novine 111/2003.
89 The slowness of the judicial process and the backlog of cases awaiting decision are a huge problem in the 
Croatian judicial system. This has already resulted in Croatia’s being sued before the European Court of Human 
Rights for breaching Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. For 
more about this, see A. Uzelac, The Rule of Law and the Judicial System: Court delays as a barrier to accession, 
CROATIAN ACCESSION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION.  INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES, ed. by Katarina Ott, Institute of Public 
Finance, Zagreb, 2004, p.105.
90 Recently, the President of the Croatian Supreme Court has, on several occasions, expressed his apprehension 
at a  flood of new legal norms resulting from the process of adjustment to the acquis. The reason for such 
apprehension is that judges cannot learn all these norms as quickly as they are created. However, if judges are 
not viewed as mechanical appliers of legal rules, then it is not necessary that they “learn” the new rules. They 
need only be able to consult them when deciding a case, understand their purpose within a given social context, 
and interpret and apply them accordingly. In such a view, the legal rule as a written text is only one element of 
the input judges need to properly apply the law. 
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participate in any kind of dialogue on shaping the legal system. This is because they do not 
see themselves as part of the law-making process. In fact, it is their view that, by admitting 
that  they  do  indeed  have  a  role  in  creating  the  law,  their  own  independence  would  be 
endangered. 
A certain amount of time will  be necessary in order for the legal  culture to change.  The 
question which arises, therefore, is whether such judges, with their formalistic view of the 
law, can function as general courts of EU law, even though they may not yet participate in 
shaping the legal system. If the answer is negative, then the recent EU enlargement may prove 
problematic, as judges from eight of the new Member States could endanger the functioning 
of the EU’s legal system.91 In the following section, I will try to demonstrate that, with a 
proper  education in  EU law, even formalistic  judges  can function in the  EU legal  order. 
Although it  is  to  be expected that  certain principles  of  EU law, such as  the  principle of 
effective judicial protection, will remain largely unapplied, this will not endanger the EU legal 
order’s functioning to such a degree that enlargement ought to have been postponed. There 
are, in fact, good arguments not to postpone further enlargement due to persistent judicial 
formalism, as EU membership will probably speed up the necessary changes. 
Domestic Courts as General Courts of EU Law
As courts  of  general  jurisdiction  for  all  questions  of  Community  law that  are  not  in  the 
exclusive jurisdiction of European courts, national courts must apply not only the Treaties and 
European  legislation,  but  also  a  number  of  judge-made  principles.  It  should  not  be  very 
difficult to teach judges about the influence which some of these principles have on their 
powers and obligations in litigation. It is easy to understand, for example, that direct effect 
and supremacy require a judge to apply a legal norm contained in a directive instead of a legal 
norm  from  the  national  code,  should  the  two  differ.  It  is  also  not  too  complicated  to 
understand that, in the present position of the ECJ, a directive should not be directly applied if 
it imposes an obligation on an individual which national law does not impose. It is also easy 
to explain that  when EC law is in  question,  a  judge is  not  permitted  to ask the national 
constitutional court to invalidate a norm in the national code, but rather must disapply it in his 
own decision.92 This will be even easier if the national constitutional order has been adjusted 
to the requirements of EU membership prior to accession, as was the case in many of the new 
Member States.93 
91 It is still too early to evaluate how the national courts of the new Member States are performing their role as 
European courts. 
92 As explained previously, Croatia’s Constitutional Law on the Constitutional  Court  and its  Act  on Courts 
establish  a  procedure  for  centralised  judicial  review  of  primary  legislation.  Thus  ordinary  judges  are  not 
empowered to decide on the constitutionality of statutes, but rather are obliged to stay the procedure and refer the 
constitutionality issue to the Constitutional Court. This situation is similar to that in Italy before the Simmenthal 
case (see n.15) was decided.
93 Slovenia’s constitution was amended in March 2003, Hungary’s in December 2002, the Czech Republic’s in 
June 2002 and Latvia’s in June 2003, while Estonia’s and Lithuania’s constitutions were complemented by new 
constitutional acts in September 2003 and July 2004, respectively. The Polish constitution was not specifically 
amended for the purposes of EU membership, but was adjusted via interpretation. As far as candidate countries 
are concerned, Romania adjusted its constitution for EU membership purposes in 2003, while Bulgaria has still 
not undertaken the amendment process. For more about constitutional adjustments for EU membership purposes, 
see: THE HOPES AND FEARS OF NEW MEMBER STATES AND (PRE)CANDIDATE COUNTRIES, Asser Institute, forthcoming in 
2005.
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Judges  can  easily  learn  the  judicial  aspects  of  Community  law  principles  and  the 
consequences these have on their powers and obligations, or, in other words, what they must 
and must not do when adjudicating a Community law case. While this will enable them to 
apply  Community  law,  it  will  not,  however,  prepare  them to  take  part  in  constitutional 
discourse. The latter requires not only mechanical application of the principles learned, but 
also a critical assessment of them, either in relation to the internal legal order or as part of the 
European legal order. Thus it is unlikely that an Eastern European judge would question the 
ECJ’s  denial  of  the  horizontal  effect  of  EU directives,  as  the  Italian  judge did.94 This  is 
because, once he learns that directives do not have effects in horizontal relations, he will not 
question this principle, but simply apply it. Whether the judge likes the consequences of such 
a solution or not will not figure into his adjudication. An Eastern European judge will simply 
not consider this to be a question that concerns him. His job is to apply the directive in a 
vertical situation, and to apply national law in a horizontal one. And since this is the law, the 
judge cannot and will not question it. Once he has learned what the positive law is (at one of 
the many seminars on Community law that have been or will be organised, many of them 
financed  through  Community  programmes95),  he  will  apply  it.  Thus,  paradoxically,  the 
positivism and  formalism of  Eastern  European judges  may sometimes  make  them “good 
European judges”, i.e. judges who faithfully apply Community law. 
There are, however, certain Community legal principles which a formalistic judge will have 
difficulty in applying, as their consequences cannot be simply listed and learned. One such 
principle  is  the  principle  of  effectiveness,  or  effective  judicial  protection,  which  requires 
judges to assess the effectiveness of all applicable national rules where Community rights are 
in question and, should he find them ineffective, to modify them. There is no easy formula 
according  to  which  one  may  assess  whether  a  national  procedural  rule  satisfies  the 
requirement  of  effectiveness,  i.e. whether  it  makes  protection  of  Community  rights 
“practically  impossible  or  excessively  difficult”.96 It  may,  therefore,  happen  that  national 
judges will not even apply this principle unless the lawyers of the parties to a case raise the 
issue. The outcome might then be that an ineffective domestic rule will be applied. However, 
it is quite likely that this happens in the courts of existing Member States on a daily basis.97 
On the assumption that there are not many such ineffective national rules, non-application of 
the principle of effective judicial protection will not endanger the Community legal order. It 
may only damage a party whose lawyer is not familiar enough with Community law. This will 
force lawyers to learn more Community law, which will, in turn, result in judges being forced 
to assess the effectiveness of national rules. If they are not sure how to do this, they will learn 
to use the preliminary ruling procedure and have the ECJ give them the answer (even if only 
94 The Giudice Conciliatore of Florence justified its reference to the ECJ in Faccini Dori (see n. 41) , whereby it  
asked the ECJ to reconsider its denial of the horizontal direct effect of directives, in the following way: “If the 
directive could be relied on only as against the State, that would be tantamount to a penalty for failure to adopt 
legislative measures of transposition as if the relationship were a purely private one.” Case Faccini Dori,see n.41, 
para. 21.  
95 For a criticism of education programmes in Community law during the pre-accession period, see F. Emmert, 
Administrative and Court Reform in Eastern and Central Europe, (2003) 9 (3) ELJ  288.
96 See, for example, case Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. SpA San Giorgo, see n. 17, para. 14.
97 The available sources on Member States’ case law involving the application of Community law include the 
Annual Reports on implementation of Community law, prepared by the Commission and available on-line and, 
as of recently, a bulletin prepared by the Research and Documentation Division of the ECJ under the name 
Reflets.  The  latter  is  available  only  in  French  at  http://curia.eu.int/en/coopju/apercu_reflets/lang/index.htm. 
These sources more often give information about the application of Community law by national courts, and less 
often about its non-application. In any case, it is not possible to gather information about the (mis-)application of 
Community law in every case before every court in all the Member States. Thus, no conclusion as to whether 
Member  States’  courts  apply Community law properly  or  not  can  ever  be  called accurate,  as  it  cannot  be 
empirically verified.
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indirectly98).  Indeed, there is  a danger that  the ECJ and,  should the potential  of the Nice 
Treaty be used, the Court of First Instance as well99 will  be overburdened by preliminary 
references from judges in new Member States.100 
The other problem for Croatian judges in applying judge-made law lies in the custom of not 
publishing judgments, due to which they are not used to following case law regularly. Thus, 
immediately after accession judges will probably start applying the Community law principles 
they have learned about at seminars organised prior to accession, but will have difficulty in 
applying the new principles developing in case law, should organised education during the 
pre-accession period (and the financing thereof) cease following accession.
Additionally,  the  translation of  EU case  law into  Croatian  will  take time,101 while  many 
Croatian judges do not have sufficient knowledge of foreign languages to read judgments in 
the existing translations.102 Furthermore, judges do not have access to and/or knowledge of the 
use of case law databases on the Internet. Most importantly, they claim not to have enough 
time to do this, given the backlog of cases they have to deal with (in Croatia, a figure of 
around 1,500,000 pending cases is usually mentioned103) and the amount of new legislation 
enacted daily. The same problems, however, existed and still exist in the new Member States 
from the 2004 enlargement. Their experience will be of great practical value in organising the 
learning process for Croatian judges.
   
Notwithstanding these problems, the deep-rooted formalism of Croatian judges, due to which 
they tend to apply the rules they have learned mechanically, without questioning them, could 
in fact help turn them into “good European judges”. For once they have learned the technical 
implications of Community principles, judges will apply them without question after Croatia 
becomes a member of the EU. They will have learned that, in conditions of EU membership, 
the principles of EC law apply. With the right measure of “European indoctrination”, Croatian 
judges can easily become good European judges.
While organised education in EU law for judges has not really begun yet in Croatia, several 
EU law courses have already taken place.104 Given that membership in the EU is the country’s 
98 Even though the ECJ has no jurisdiction regarding the assessment of a Member State’s internal law under a 
preliminary ruling procedure, national courts often use this procedure to get answers about the validity of an 
internal  rule, rather than about proper interpretation of a Community rule. If the ECJ finds such a question 
interesting, it will reformulate the national court’s question and give an indirect answer regarding the (in)validity 
of the national rule in question.
99 The amendments to the organisation of EU level courts proposed by the Nice Treaty envisaged the possibility 
of granting the CFI power to decide certain types  of cases in preliminary ruling (Article 225/3 TEC). This 
possibility has not yet been made use of. The recently signed Constitutional Treaty does not add anything new in 
this respect (Article III-263/3 of the Constitutional Treaty). It only renames the Court of First Instance as the 
General Court.
100 However, in first eight months of the membership of new States in the EU, there were only two requests for 
preliminary ruling by their courts, both from Hungary. Both cases are still pending. These are case C-302/04 
Ynos Kft. V Varga János and case C-328/04 Vajnai Attila. 
101 In accordance with a legal culture that neglects case law, priority in translation is given to EU legislation.
102 Many of the new 2004 Member States had not translated the entire case law by the date of their accession to 
the EU.
103 The Commission’s opinion on Croatia’s application for membership states a figure of 1.38 million pending 
cases, COM (2004) 257 final, 20 April 2004, p. 18.
104 These were organised on an ad hoc basis and financed by various foreign foundations and institutions, such as 
the German Foundation for International Legal Cooperation (IRZ) or the Asser Institute of The Hague. In 2004 a 
Judicial  Academy  was  established  within  the  Ministry  of  Justice,  with  the  task  of  organising  permanent 
education for judges. Thus this institution will probably organise most of the education in EU law for judges in 
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number  one  political  goal,  that  Croatia  has  received  candidate  status  and  all  the  funds 
accompanying such status,  and that  reform of the judiciary is  among the priorities in the 
Commission’s opinion on Croatia’s membership application105 and the decision establishing a 
European  Partnership  with  Croatia,106 it  is  to  be  expected  that  there  will  be  plenty  of 
programmes for educating judges in EU law.107 The recently established Judicial Academy108 
is in charge of organising permanent education for judges, with EU law as its priority area.109 
It is to be expected, therefore, that Croatian judges will be educated predominantly in EU law 
in the years to come. 
However, there is little chance that Community law principles will be judicially applied prior 
to  formal  EU accession,  even though there  are  good reasons to  do  so.  For  example,  the 
principle of indirect effect might be applied in the pre-accession period, as large numbers of 
new legal codes are being passed or amended as part of the process of harmonising Croatia’s 
legal order with the acquis communautaire.110 However, the experience of other ex-communist 
countries teaches us that, prior to accession, EU law will remain foreign law, and judges will 
not take it into consideration, even as an interpretational tool. 
With  the  exception  of  the  Polish  Constitutional  Court,111 Community  law  was  almost 
completely disregarded in other Central European countries prior to their accession. Zdenek 
Kühn’s comment illustrates this very clearly: “Apart from this field [competition law – auth.], 
however, judicial awareness of the Czech Association Agreement with the EU is not high, and 
the future. 
105 Opinion on Croatia’s Application for Membership of the European Union, COM (2004) 257 final, Brussels, 
20 April 2004.
106 Council Decision 2004/648 (see n.2) on the principles, priorities and conditions contained in the European 
Partnership with Croatia. 
107 The EU has already started financing programmes for the education of judges via the CARDS programme. 
There is an ongoing CARDS project aimed at helping the recently established Judicial Academy to organise 
permanent education for judges.   
108 The Academy was  established in  2004 as  part  of  the  Ministry  of  Justice.  More  information  about  it  is 
contained on its web page www.pravosudje.hr/centar/index.html
109 However, the new institution will not make much of a difference if judges are not motivated to learn and 
adapt. The Present Act on Courts already envisages obligatory permanent education for judges. However, in 
general judges have not developed a habit of systematic self-education, the excuse very often being a lack of 
time and money.  In this respect,  see A. Kovačić,  Stalna stručna izobrazba i usavršavanje sudaca,  Hrvatska 
pravna revija, December 2001, p. 132. 
110 One may even argue that there is an obligation to conform judicial interpretation to EU law. Namely, both the 
Stabilisation and Association Agreement and the requirements imposed for EU membership require Croatia to 
adjust its laws to the acquis communautaire. This cannot be accomplished by the mere enactment of seemingly 
compatible legal norms, but rather by conforming the application of legal norms to EU law in practice. Thus 
interpretation of  Croatian norms in light  of  the Community law to which they have been adjusted may be 
understood as  an obligation undertaken under  the  SAA,  one  which is  binding  on the  state  in  all  respects, 
including the courts. A similar opinion has been expressed by the Polish Constitutional Court; see the following 
footnote.
111 The Polish Constitutional Court interpreted the provision of the Association Agreement,  whereby Poland 
undertook a soft obligation to harmonise its law with the acquis communautaire,  as imposing on judges an 
obligation to conform their interpretations with Community law. In the 1997 Gender Equality in Civil Service 
case, this court stated: “Of course, EU law has not binding force in Poland. The Constitutional Tribunal wishes,  
however, to emphasise the provisions of Article 68 and 69 of the [Polish Association Agreement]… Poland is  
thereby obliged to  use ‘its  best  endeavours to  ensure  that  future legislation is  compatible with Community 
legislations’… The Constitutional Tribunal holds that the obligation to ensure compatibility of legislation (born 
above all, by the parliament and government) results also in the obligation to interpret the existing legislation in  
such a way as to ensure the greatest possible degree of such compatibility.” Quoted as per Z. Kühn,  Application 
of European law in Central European candidate countries, (2003) 28 ELRev. 551, p. 553/554. 
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EU law as an interpretational tool is rarely brought into play.  The Czech case law almost 
never goes into comparisons of the possible meanings of the domestic legislation with EU law 
and does not touch the issue of European dimension of domestic law. This is also the case 
with the Slovak courts. The Slovak Supreme Court’s decision of August 25, 1999 stands as an 
example.  In this case the Court refused to deal  with EU law as an argumentative tool to 
interpret  domestic  law  in  a  Euro-friendly  way.  The  Court  clearly  did  not  distinguish 
authoritative and persuasive arguments, as in the Court’s view ‘the claim relating to disregard 
of EU directive is not relevant to assess legality of the challenged decision considering the 
current stage of EU integration.’ In other words, European law is beyond the orbit of ordinary 
judiciary until the accession.”112
The same attitude towards Community law may be expected from the Croatian judiciary in 
the period before accession. Croatia has signed a Stabilisation and Association Agreement 
(SAA) with the EU. The agreement has entered into the force in February 2005. In order to 
implement  trade-related  parts  of  the  SAA,  the  EC  and  Croatia  adopted  an  Interim 
Agreement,113 which has been applied as of 1 January 2002, and entered into force on 1 
March 2002.
 
Using the presently available databases of case law in Croatian courts, no record has been 
found of any case before any court whose decisions are reported in which either the Interim 
Agreement or  SAA were mentioned.  Thus,  so far  the Interim Agreement  has never been 
applied in order to resolve a case, and neither the SAA nor the Interim Agreement have been 
used as an aid in interpreting domestic law. One reason may be that it is too soon, so that no 
dispute involving these agreements has arisen in practice or reached the courts. However, it is 
more likely that neither courts nor lawyers are aware of the existence of these agreements or 
their possible significance to a given case. The latter conclusion suggests itself when one 
considers Croatian courts’ record in using other international treaties in the judicial process, 
either directly114 or indirectly. 
For example,  Croatia  has been a party to the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter the European Convention) since 1997. 
As far as ordinary courts are concerned, there is no evidence that they have ever applied the 
European Convention directly in resolving a dispute. There are, however, a few examples in 
which the Supreme Court has used the European Convention for interpretational purposes. In 
several cases it has referred to Article 6 of the European Convention in order to interpret 
Croatia’s Law on Expropriation115 or,  more precisely, the provisions of that law that were 
adopted in order to bring it into harmony with the Convention, following a decision by the 
Constitutional Court declaring their incompatibility.116 There are also a few examples of the 
112 Z. Kühn, Application of European law in Central European candidate countries, see n. 111, p.  554.
113 This was also the usual practice with the Association Agreements signed by Central and Eastern European 
countries  (CEEC).  Since  Association  Agreements  are  mixed  agreements,  their  entry  into  force  depends  on 
ratification not only by the EC, but also by all the Member States. This process of ratification takes time. In the 
period between the signing of such agreements and their entry into force, the EC has signed Interim Agreements 
with CEECs, relating only to those parts of the Association Agreements covered by the chapter on Common 
Commercial Policy in the TEC, for which the EC has exclusive competence both internally and externally.
114 The Croatian Constitution (Article 140) makes international treaties that Croatia has ratified a part of its legal 
order, placing them above the ordinary laws. Courts are empowered to apply such international treaties. The Act 
on Courts expressly mentions international treaties among the sources of law that judges may apply (Article 5 of 
the Act on Courts).   
115 See decisions of the Croatian Supreme Court, VSRH Gr 1-562/02-2; Gr 1-602/02-2; Gr 1- 607/02-2;  and Gr 
1-662/02-2.
116 See decision of the Croatian Constitutional Court U-I/745/1999.
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Supreme Court referring to other international conventions, for example ILO Convention No. 
131, in order to confirm its interpretation of Croatia’s Law on Labour Relations.117
The Constitutional Court has a better record of applying the European Convention. It has used 
it  as a  basis for invalidating Croatian laws contrary to the Convention’s provisions in its 
abstract judicial review procedure.118 The Court developed the now well-established principle 
that non-conformity of Croatian laws with an international treaty represents a breach of the 
principle of the rule of law and violates the Constitution.119 It  has also used the European 
Convention as an interpretative tool, sometimes citing the case law of the European Court of 
Human Rights.120 There is no evidence that any ordinary court has cited the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights.  
Although there are some examples of the application of international treaties, these are few in 
number.  All  of  them  relate  to  international  law  which  is  legally  binding  in  Croatia 
(conventions  that  have  been  ratified).  I  did  not  find  any  cases  in  which  courts  took 
Community law, either primary or secondary, into account when interpreting Croatian law. It 
is to be expected that, were such a proposal put to a court, its reaction would be similar to that 
of  the  Slovak  Constitutional  Court:121 prior  to  accession,  Croatian  courts  cannot  take 
Community law into account. 
This is one argument against postponing membership in the EU until a country’s judiciary has 
undergone cultural change, and the use of persuasive sources of law has become common 
practice. Providing that judges learn the basics of Community law, they will be willing to 
apply  it,  however  mechanically,  once  a  country  joins  the  EU.  Moreover,  application  of 
Community law and its principles will most likely speed up the necessary change in legal 
culture, leading to the complete transformation of ex-communist legal systems into modern 
judiciaries capable of responsible, creative legal interpretation and open to new ideas. 
Conclusion: Judicial Formalism and How to Eliminate It  
Although there have been certain improvements, Croatian judges still function in a system 
that is largely formalistic, and denies judges any role in creating the law. Judges’ perception 
of their own role fits into this system. They see themselves only as appliers of the written law, 
which is  objective and contains solutions to all  possible  real-life situations,  so that  every 
dispute may be resolved using pure deductive logic. The impact of their decisions on real life 
is not important, since the law has been given, and cannot be changed. Judges view the legal 
rules as an end in themselves, rather than as a means of achieving certain social objectives and 
policy choices.122 Therefore, they do not take such social objectives and policy choices into 
consideration in the adjudication process. 
117 See decision of the Croatian Supreme Court VSRH Rev-3928/1994-2.
118 See, for example, decision of the Constitutional Court U-I/745/1999.
119 Decision of the Constitutional Court U-I-920/1995; U-I-950/1996 of 15 July 1998, Narodne novine 41/1998. 
For  more,  see  S.  Rodin,  Main  Accents  in  Practice  of  the  Constitutional  Court  (1991-2001),  in:  CROATIAN 
JUDICIARY:  LESSONS AND PERSPECTIVES, Croatian Helsinki Committee for Human Rights and Netherlands Helsinki 
Committee, Zagreb 2002, p. 219.
120 See, for example, decisions of the Constitutional Court U-I/745/1999 or U-III / 2962 / 2002.
121 See n.112.
122 See, in this regard, M. D. A. Freeman’s introduction to the theories of adjudication in Lloyd’s INTRODUCTION TO 
JURISPRUDENCE, 6th ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 1994, p. 1258.
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Given  such  a  self-perception,  judges  are  not  placed  on  an  equal  footing  with  the  other 
branches  of  government.  They lack  the  ability  to  participate  in  any kind of  dialogue on 
shaping the legal system, for they do not see themselves as part of the law-making process. 
One of the reasons for this is their belief that granting judges such a role would transform 
them into legislators. Creativity in judicial interpretation always raises such concerns, and yet, 
if judges in Western European courts have not become legislators, this is not because they 
have  strictly  abided  by  the  text  of  legal  norms.  Talking  about  the  boundary  separating 
legitimate development of the law by judges from legislative activity, Lord Goff commented 
in Woolwich Building Society v IRC (No. 2) as follows:  “…although I  am aware of the 
existence of the boundary, I am never quite sure where to find it. Its position seems to vary 
from case  to  case”.123 This  will  probably  be  the  most  difficult  task  in  transforming  the 
judiciary: to allow judicial creativity, but make judges aware of the boundaries. As there is no 
means of prescribing these boundaries, judges will have to learn how to find them themselves. 
This is more an intuitive process than a logical one. And intuition cannot be imposed, but only 
internalised during the long process of learning to understand the law differently. 
The  change  that  needs  to  happen  in  order  to  make  Croatian  judges  ready  for  European 
constitutionalism is, therefore, not one that will happen overnight. Yet the sooner it starts, the 
sooner it can be accomplished. The proper place for this change to begin are the law schools. 
Legal education needs to be adapted so that  it  can prepare future “thinking” judges.  The 
timing for a change in the educational  system is perfect. The requirements of joining the 
European  integration  process,  including  the  Bologna  Process,  are  pressuring  the  existing 
educational system to transform. These external pressures may overcome the internal inertia 
of the system. Provided this transformation does not remain merely formal, but also brings 
changes in the curricula, syllabuses and methods of legal education, future Croatian judges 
will be prepared to participate in European constitutional discourse.124 
As the transformation of legal culture will take time, the question to be raised is whether a 
country should obtain EU membership before it happens. The answer offered by this article is 
that it can. At the beginning of membership, a new EU country’s judges need not necessarily 
be ready for their constitutionalising role. A judiciary ready to apply, but not to question and, 
therefore, modify and improve European legal rules will not bring new ideas and challenges 
to the existing legal order, yet it will also not endanger its functioning, provided that judges 
are  educated  in  basic  Community  law.  Therefore,  it  would  be  possible  to  grant  Croatia 
membership status as soon as its judges “learn” Community law. By that time, its judiciary 
will most likely not yet  have abandoned its formalism, and will continue to view itself as 
having only a very modest role in the legal system. For a true change in legal culture, Croatia 
will need more time. However, participation in the new European legal order may speed up 
the  process  of  transformation  of  this  society’s  legal  culture,  including its  judiciary.  This, 
paradoxically, may turn “good European judges” into bad ones, as they may start questioning 
the legal order within which they function. However, without such judges the European legal 
order would never have been created in the first place.
123 (1992) 3 All ER 737, p. 760-761.
124 See, in this regard, M.W. Hesselink, THE NEW EUROPEAN LEGAL CULTURE, Nijhoff, 2001, pp.60-63.
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